

Zero Tolerance - An Adequate Crime Policy?

Introduction

According to all the polls assessing what voters thought, the number one issue in the election just past was crime. Yet there was little or no debate on the issue. Why? To answer this question we need to understand both the underlying causes and the political economy of crime in this country.

At a surface level the non-debate on crime occurred because Fianna Fail and the Progressive democrats offered the slogan of Zero Tolerance as a radical new policy and the Rainbow coalition feared challenging that policy slogan in case it would be a vote loser for them. In retrospect the success of Fianna Fail in Dublin and Cork is also being read as an endorsement of their get-tough-on-crime approach as both cities show the highest levels of crime in the country.

The recent intense concern about crime is understandable when we look at the crime statistics. Indictable crime in this country, 98% of which is either larcenies or burglaries, rose steadily during the 1970s to a peak in the early 1980s. The first half of the 1980s was a period which corresponded with the first drugs crisis. Crime dropped somewhat in the period from 1986-1990 but still remained at a much higher level than in the 1970s. In the early 1990s however indictable crime has risen again to the levels of the early 1980s and lo and behold we are in the midst of our second drugs crisis.

It is interesting to note that crime levels now are not much above their peak in the early 1980s. It is also true that Ireland still has a very low overall crime rate in comparison with other countries in Europe. (see Diagram Two).

This does not give grounds for the least complacency, however. For one thing all crime is injurious to others and therefore unacceptable. The high level of burglaries and larcenies victimises a large proportion of the population. Furthermore there was intense concern about crime in the early 1980s just as there is now. Moreover there are worrying new elements in our crime figures such as

- the large increase in sexual offences from just above 300 per year on average between 1981-1990 to 850 in 1995.(i)
- the increase in homicides especially in the past couple of years.
- more generally the steady rise in serious crime reflected in the increase in the number of prison sentences of 2 years to life from just 30 in 1970 to 550 in 1995.(ii)

The support for Zero Tolerance is unsurprising as an immediate reaction to the problem. What is more curious is the lack of real debate about whether Zero Tolerance is the only or best strategy to tackle crime and the lack of any coherent presentation of other options.

The Ambiguous Causes of Crime

In seeking to understand the crime figures we suggest that it is important to distinguish between two sets of causes. First, there are underlying changes in Irish society which are leading to a rising level of crime. These explain the trend increase in crime over the 1970s. They are changes which we share in common with other western democracies. Then there are the interlinked social evils of drug addiction and urban areas deprived of opportunity through concentrated long term unemployment and poverty.

A list of some of the underlying changes in Irish society which probably have some impact on crime are

- 1) changing sense of family and increase in family breakdown;
- 2) the increase in easily robbed valuable items available in a consumer society;
- 3) profound cultural shift from the "absolute experience of authority" in the 1950s to the "absolute authority of experience" in the 1990s;
- 4) the consequent crisis in authority roles affecting teachers, parents, police, politicians, religious leaders, and the stumbling search for new authoritative models of teaching, parenting, policing, governing, ministering;
- 5) the fragmentation of communities;
- 6) the loss of a sense of

adherence to a religiously based moral code;

Many of the social trends have brought advantages as well as costs. Indeed it is only in appreciating this that we can search together for solutions to be constructed in our future rather than hark back to idealisations of the past. Traditional family roles often imprisoned women in the home and locked men into authoritarian roles. Consumer goods bring many benefits which we all enjoy. Few if any want to go back to a world in which things are right and wrong just because someone says so. Many benefits have come from more participative, encouraging, and responsabilising patterns of teaching, parenting etc. Cohesive communities in the 1950s were at times socially suffocating like 'the valley of the squinting windows'. The traditional religious moral code did not leave much room for growing, or learning from mistakes, nor had it much tolerance for difference. Furthermore the system which propagated it has recently been exposed as at times cruel, hypocritical and abusive.

The recent Department of Justice Discussion Paper entitled *Tackling Crime* aptly quoted former Garda Commissioner, Patrick Culligan on these underlying causes.

"In what passes for public discussion on criminal justice matters there is very little consideration given to how society has changed over the years. If we are serious about doing something about it we must address the changes

which have taken place in society and which have contributed immeasurably to the problems."

One of the changes cited by Culligan as contributing to increasing crime is the reduction of prison sentences by temporary release. Yet this is an instance of the failure of the Irish state to develop any comprehensive system of alternative sanctions to prison. We continue massively to overuse prison as a sanction for less serious offences and this contributes much to the flow of temporary releases.(iii) So the crisis in the containment institution is in part at least due to the failure to develop a long overdue more beneficial alternative. This is acknowledged by the Department in its stress on developing alternatives to custody.(iv)

In relation to the fragmentation of centre-city communities and their dispersal to new housing estates, that dispersal in itself was due to the severe crisis in centre-city slums. The problem lay not in the provision of well built houses in new estates. Instead it lay in the creation of new ghettos because house-building was not followed up with investment in facilities and community building which could have ensured that these new estates did not become ghettos.

The Social Evils which boost Crime

This leads us to the two other interlinked social evils present in Irish society since the early 1980s which without doubt have

significantly contributed to the rise in crime, *namely the rise in long term unemployment and the drugs problem.*

The fluctuations in the long term unemployment figures give a good indicator of the state of opportunities facing poorer areas in our cities and towns. The early 1980s saw the share of the labour force who were long term unemployed rise from about 2% in 1979, to a peak level of nearly 8% in 1987. All during this time opportunities were evaporating especially for 'unskilled' males in poor areas. Then in the latter years of the 1980s opportunities improved somewhat and this percentage fell to about 6% by 1992. However it rose again subsequently to about 7% in 1993. It has now begun to fall slowly again.

Of course it would be totally untrue to suggest that the long term unemployed as a group are responsible for crime. Rather the point is that excluding entire communities from any chance to participate meaningfully in society will inevitably lead to a increasing number (even if still a small minority) resorting to crime. For one thing the destruction of working class male roles (and persons) through long term unemployment has significantly destabilised family life in poorer areas. Furthermore from a narrow economic perspective some robbery can be viewed as a kind of taxation exacted by those who are excluded in society on those who are included. This is no justification for crime; instead it indicates that tackling crime must address its root causes.

The connected social evil of the heroin centred drug culture is an evident cause of crime. Some suggest that as much as 70% of all crime is drug related. The correlation between the two drugs crises and the peaks in crime in the early 1980s and early 1990s suggests a strong link. Evidently the drug culture based around the painkiller heroin is also directly linked to areas in our cities which experience the pain of long run social exclusion.(v)

The importance of the underlying causal significance of social deprivation in explaining crime is also reflected in the composition of our prison population as analysed by Dr Paul O'Mahony in his recent Department of Justice commissioned study *Mountjoy Prisoners : A Sociological & Criminological Profile*.(vi) Of the samples he interviewed

25% only had ever sat a public exam

42% were not brought up by both parents until the age of 16

44% had a sibling who had been in prison

50% had left school before 15

63% had used heroin for an average of seven years

65% came from homes with a father who was chronically unemployed or from the lowest socio-economic grouping

69% were under 30

77% had spent time in St Patrick's Institution

88% had been unemployed prior to their committal to prison

90% came from families with more than four children

94% were in the two lowest economic categories according to their best ever job.

Social Segregation and the Politics of Crime

The life stories of individuals that lie behind these figures are all too familiar to those who have visited the prisons or who live and/or work in areas of significant social deprivation. Yet they are quite unfamiliar to many who live in middle or high income areas. In our socially segregated two tiered cities many never travel through, nor know people who live in, these areas. Their perception of criminals therefore is uniquely refracted through the twin optics of experience as victims or media representation. Yet these optics are typically blind to the histories of those who commit offences and therefore ignorant of the factors which make some more at risk of becoming criminals than others. There is a curious voyeurism in Irish society which dwells on crime. Pages of newspapers tell of the latest offence and recount court proceedings. In the blank margins of all this newsprint however lie the untold stories of offenders. The what, where, when and how of each offence is detailed but we rarely ask why offenders offend. Up until recently too the stories of victims were also ignored but now receive some attention.

The consequences of social segregation has profound political and economic implications in dealing with crime. The impact of social segregation becomes apparent when one asks

- why for so long was so little investment made in the new

housing estates to build up community facilities?

- why was the infrastructure of drug treatment not set up adequately after the first drugs crisis in the early 1980s and is only now being implemented after another crisis?
- why was the fundamental tax reform to eliminate poverty traps and enable the long term unemployed to catch the economic boom not yet been implemented?(vii)

The answer to these questions is relatively simple. All these changes require resources which have to be financed by taxpayers from the middle and higher income communities. Yet these communities are only half aware of the reality of the problems and thus it is difficult to muster political support for the scale of investment needed. Furthermore those who live with the problems typically do not vote and so their concerns are often left to a series of concerned groups to lobby on their behalf.

Now however even prominent business persons such as Michael Smurfit are articulating the need to tackle our two tiered society because of the fear of continuing rising crime, which does directly affect the middle and higher income communities. The critical factors underlying crime, such as long term unemployment and heroin addiction, typically do not affect middle and higher income communities as intensely as poorer ones. However crime does directly affect them. So although inaction is politically possible on

the underlying cause of crime which are allowed to fester for a long time, inaction is not politically possible on rising crime itself especially when it crosses a threshold of tolerance.

This socio-political dynamic presents us with a fundamental 'choice'. On the one hand when we react in an immediate and knee jerk fashion to the experience of increased crime we will tend to favour an approach which only deals effectively with the symptoms of the problem. This approach focuses on the **detection - conviction - punishment** process. That is a legitimate first reaction of self-defence and it explains why many would favour a Zero-Tolerance approach to crime. On the other hand if we take care to look beyond the immediate experience of crime, into our prisons, and if we ever talk to and get to know offenders, then a different process will seem obvious if we want to reduce crime. This is a process of **education-restitution-opportunity provision**.

Any balanced view will see both these processes as interdependent and vital to an effective crime strategy.

The Questionable Relevance of Zero Tolerance

Much hope has been placed in the Zero Tolerance approach. We can ask however: what does it mean, and will it work? The kernel of the idea of zero tolerance contains several interconnected elements

- intensive policing

- the idea that offenders progress from petty to serious offences
- the conviction that every crime must be punished.

The policing strategy in New York under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Commissioner William Bratton is given as a shining example of the Zero Tolerance approach. It involved a heavy emphasis on arresting people for minor infringements as well as more serious crimes and was accompanied by a sharp decline in the crime figures. It is not at all clear however that it is a relevant example for us.

The most important difference is that the state of crime and the state of policing were far worse in new York than here when the Zero Tolerance approach was brought in. For instance policing was appalling in New York and confined itself to responding to emergency calls alone with a defeatist and demoralised attitude to all other police intervention. Secondly the level of violent crime, robberies and shootings was extraordinarily high. There were twelve times as many shootings in New York than in London in 1990. By 1995 after the implementation of the Zero Tolerance approach this had fallen to eight times as many. This fall was largely due to a policy of persistent 'stop-frisk-arrest' that reduced the number of hand guns being carried by young men. This extreme situation does not match ours, as Diagram Two (above) shows. Zero Tolerance then seems to be a strategy to dramatically reduce extreme levels of crime and inept

policing. It must also be remembered that even though Zero Tolerance appeared to work to reduce crime in New York to half its 1990 level the crime level there is many times higher than the crime level here.

Another feature which is significant is that when the Zero Tolerance approach came in some very significant changes had *already* been implemented in New York which had an impact on reducing crime. Bob Bowling of the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University identifies these as "increased police strength financed by a new tax imposed by the former mayor Dinkins; matching funds for conflict resolution; open all hours "beacon" schools; leadership training; a plethora of other community based crime prevention projects." He also notes that "most importantly the crack "epidemic" of the mid to late 1980s had peaked and was waning." By the time the Zero Tolerance approach was launched "much of the drug war had already been won and lost, and murder was on the decline." Demographic movements have also contributed to the fall in crime.

There have also been indefensible aspects to the Zero Tolerance strategy. Many homeless people in New York were arrested for vagrancy and given a criminal record thus compounding their difficulties. Indeed the New York police now feel the need to introduce 'be nice' strategy because the general public have become afraid of them and not just the criminals. In

contrast "Zero Tolerance" has been implemented quite differently in the United Kingdom. At Kings Cross for example extra police officers were deployed to provide 24 hour high profile foot patrols but this was combined with police working with local charities and the council to help alcoholics and addicts to get treatment and places to stay. This type of intensive community based policing would only be possible on a wide scale here through the injection of significant extra resources.(viii)

The kernel of truth in Zero Tolerance is not to be found in aping a New York solution. Instead we suggest that our own experience with Operation Free Flow, the Drink Driving Campaign, and Operation Dochas, and co-operation between Gardai and local communities in tackling drug pushing in areas of our cities, illustrate the effectiveness of well co-ordinated and well targeted intensive policing.

In relation to drug issues this type of policing is at its most effective when it is linked in with the local community. Community links reduce the search costs for the police by giving them good local knowledge. Hence it is necessary for the Gardai to make community police officers a real priority within the force. It is not enough to bemoan the declining respect for Gardai in contemporary Irish society. Instead, building on good work done already in many areas, the Gardai should pro-actively forge good relationships with the communities in which they work. Though good things are already

happening in this regard more is needed.

In other areas of crime such as traffic and drink driving offences, short, randomly occurring, variable periods of intensive policing would be much more effective than the well signalled periods of intensive Garda attention that we have now.

The only good things to be salvaged from the evidence about 'Zero Tolerance' amount to

- a resource intensive policing strategy which would comprise random intensive policing of minor offences (not including persecution of the already disadvantaged),
- accurately targeted and specialised policing of drugs pushers in a no-holds-barred fashion,
- targeting of policing of poorer communities through intensive co-operation with the community.

The New York story is relevant also in indicating the range of alternative educative and opportunity-building structures that are perhaps just as effective in reducing crime levels as 'Zero Tolerance' posturing.

If one wants an apt snappy acronym to replace the Zero Tolerance slogan with we suggest that **STOP** will serve to stand for

Strategic (the stress is on prioritisation in policing)

Targeted (through specialist units and community links)

Ongoing (including random concentrated bouts of policing on less serious offences)

Policing

The Ethics of Punishment and Crime

Our argument however is not just about the effectiveness or relevance of Zero Tolerance and an alternative view of effective policing. It is also a disagreement with a one dimensional approach to crime which focuses only on **detection-conviction-imprisonment**. Even the **STOP** approach is still limited to that dimension. We suggest however, that this approach, *when* it is not complemented with the **education-restitution-opportunity provision** approach, is **ethically deficient**.

The figures quoted above that describe our prison population sketch an image of a severely disadvantaged group who have been excluded from the common good that the majority of Irish society take for granted, i.e. education, health, employment, a stable home. Given their exclusion, how then can we justify ethically a purely punitive approach that will effectively damage them more and reduce further their chances of building lives for themselves? We all would agree no doubt that **the punishment should fit the crime**. However our legal system also acknowledges that **the punishment should fit the offender** when it takes into account the circumstances surrounding any given offence

and the mental health of offenders. There can be no justice unless both principles are taken into account.

More fundamentally it is helpful to think about what we mean when we speak of punishment. Pat Riordan S.J. offers some helpful perspectives in his book *A Politics of the Common Good*.(ix)

In our everyday life, states Riordan, a very common model of punishment is **corrective**. This type of punishment occurs typically in families and schools. A wide variety of punitive measures are employed in these contexts such as being grounded, withdrawal of pocket money, extra household chores, extra homework, detention, being reported to parents, fines, clean up work around the school. Indeed the underlying model of corrective punishment has changed in family and schools, beating and corporal punishment are no longer acceptable, and the emphasis has shifted from sheer deterrence through inflicting pain to the learning that occurs for the child through the sanction. This is linked to the wider cultural changes we referred to above. Our criminal justice system however has not as yet undergone a corresponding evolution.

A second very common model of punishment is **restorative**. It occurs in situations where the offending behaviour has created a situation which is capable of being reversed to some extent. In sport a foul committed to gain an advantage is punished through a free kick, penalty etc. that aims to

restore the advantage to the team which has been disadvantaged. If a child breaks a window or does some damage to property parents will often require them to repair the damage done or pay for its repair.

Pat Riordan notes that both these models of punishment presuppose a **shared common good**. Corrective punishment is administered so that children may come to appreciate behaviour in line with the common good that respects others. Restoration also presupposes a common good, either that of the equal participation in the game, or the common good acknowledged in willingness to repair damage caused.

This is a third model that is different in that there is no shared common good. An image that Pat Riordan uses is the "Wild West" where order is imposed on a chaotic conflict-ridden situation through use of brute force by the sheriff. We can call this a **retributive** model of punishment. It is not just confined to the cinema however. The Cold War was characterised by the lack of a global sense of the common good and stability was maintained between the superpowers through threat of mutual destruction. This image is also apt for a civil conflict situation where the sheer force of security forces is called on to ensure the protection of the parties to the conflict who cannot agree to any shared common good.

It is important to note that all

three models are forms of punishment which impose 'costs' on the offender. They all have some deterrent effects. The corrective model reinforces the direct deterrence effect of the sanction with education. The restorative model reinforces the direct deterrence effect with a strengthening of the shared common good. The retributive model of punishment on the other hand relies on pure deterrence through threat of pain and the fear it induces.

This understanding of punishment is of great relevance in relation to our crime situation. We have already noted how our population of offenders is typically excluded from the common good. It is precisely because they do not and 'cannot' share in that common good that they are more likely to engage in crime. This gives us the 'choice'. We can view them as enemies and 'wage war' upon them through pure deterrence. One version of Zero Tolerance is very close to this approach. On the other hand when we look at the population of offenders we can see that they have not individually chosen to be excluded from the common good. Instead they have been born into circumstances where from birth the cards were stacked against them. Unless we collectively address that exclusion is it ethically justifiable to tackle crime *exclusively* along the one dimensional route of **detection-conviction-imprisonment**?

Where the **retribution** model is most apt perhaps is in the case of the drugs war or very serious sexual or violent crime. The drugs

crisis is perhaps the most *extensive* undermining of the common good. When someone is on drugs the feelings and fears of other people are secondary to the need to feed one's habit. So burglary and larceny explode. In a very real way then society is 'at war' with the organised criminal network that deals in drugs and profits from it.

On the other hand a **retributive** model is not ethically justifiable for most addicts. Offences committed to get drugs are offences committed with diminished freedom. Addiction itself involves diminished freedom. This does not mean that addicts are not responsible, however it does mean that they need help. So while society must be protected effectively from larceny and burglary it must also provide the resources to allow addicts to get effective treatment. That means local treatment centres, proper organisation and restructuring of the methadone maintenance program.(x) Surely resources pumped in here will produce a better and more enduring return in crime reduction than simply doubling the prison spaces?

Another key element that must be addressed in any ethical criminal justice policy is the reality that much white collar crime goes unpunished. White collar crime is by definition crime committed by those who **do** already participate in the common good. If these people can get away lightly with their offences then how can poorer communities accept ever more rigorous policing to catch those offenders who typically have

been excluded from this common good from the moment they were born? The Department of Justice discussion paper notes that "there are indications of costs (of "white collar" crime) running to hundreds of £ millions a year". Then in a very pertinent comment the Department notes that

"There is a tendency on the part of people who are more educated, articulate or affluent to think of crime as the wrongdoing mainly of those generally in less advantaged situations. There tends to be a certain ambivalence, therefore, in relation to the significance of offences such as drink driving, fraud, tax evasion, and other forms of "white collar" crime. One of the problems about this, of course, is that the ambivalence does not go unnoticed by those who cannot afford cars and are in poorer circumstances, which in turn has the effect of lowering confidence in and respect generally for the law and criminal justice system as a whole."(xi)

It will be interesting to see if less tolerance for this type of crime will be as big a vote winner as Zero Tolerance for larceny and burglary by drug addicts.

A Positive set of Proposals

We have already indicated some elements of a positive set of proposals to tackle crime.

As yet however we have not outlined what we mean by an

education-restitution-opportunity provision approach to crime reduction.

In outlining this approach we start from the Department of Justice's major recommendation on supervised community sanctions as an alternative to prison sentences. In *Tackling Crime* the Department notes that supervised community sanctions have many positive advantages over prison sentences. They

- avoid wasteful occupancy of prison spaces
- ease the necessity for large numbers of early releases
- help re-integrate offenders into their local community,
- utilise local facilities and resources,
- provide an opportunity for the offender to change their outlook on their behaviour,
- maintain rather than break family and employment ties,
- avoid extended association with other hardened offenders,
- are far less expensive than prison,
- are confirmed by international research to be at least as effective as prison sentences.(xii)

In our view this recommended change in direction within the Irish criminal justice system is very much to be welcomed. Clearly it requires that significant resources be channelled into the Probation and Welfare services. The extent of any prison building program should be decided upon only on the assumption that sufficient funds are already being spent to implement a full scale system of supervised and restitutive

community sanctions. Otherwise we may well spend all our available resources on prison spaces and continue to over use custodial sentences, filling ever larger prisons. This would be triply poor service;

- poor service to the taxpayer who has to finance these expensive custodial sentences,
- poor service to the victims because prison does little to either deter or rehabilitate offenders,
- poor service to the offenders whose chances in life are further damaged by custodial sentences thus returning them to the destructive cycle of crime.

In a community sanctions approach we would argue that the stress should be on forms of punishment that are **corrective** and **restorative**. The corrective element of sanctions could be treatment for addiction or emotional problems. It could also involve education of the offender by the community so that the offender will learn to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. There are a host of well developed programs that have been piloted in many parts of the world which centre around the concept of restorative justice. These involve sanctions which restore the hurt and damage cause by the offence. They include programs that

- distribute the confiscated assets of big time drug pushers to fund drug treatment centres or victim support groups,
- mediate between the victim and the offender so that the offender really sees and feels

the damage they have caused so that the victim can come to terms with their own fear, and understand what motivated the offender,

- allow sanctions agreed by the community where the work done provides some useful asset to the community in return for the damage to the community through the committal of the offence,
- organise family group conferences where the offender is 'shamed' by their own extended family or peer group through confrontation with their own behaviour and offered ways in which they make restitution and be re-integrated into the family group.

Even many very serious sexual offenders and violent offenders, whom we all too often class as monsters, can break the cycle of offending if they are given sufficient therapeutic help. The evidence from Grendon therapeutic prison in the United Kingdom is striking in this regard. Grendon accepts a mixture of sexual and serious offenders and treats them together in one therapeutic prison community. The evidence from there has been assessed empirically by the Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate and finds that the chances of re-offending were significantly lower for those who went through the Grendon program, especially those who stayed for more than 18 months in the program.(xiii)

This approach to punishment of offenders is consistent with the a

broader need to provide education and opportunity to those in poorer areas that are particularly at risk of getting caught up in crime. A lot of attention is currently being focused, through a variety of programs, on children at risk of dropping out of school. This should also be complemented by programs that can flexibly target children at risk from birth up to their entrance into primary school. One such program is the Lifestart program which is delivered in the home through a system of family visitors.(xiv)

Apart from targeting education, there is also the need to provide opportunities for ex-offenders on completion of their sanction or sentence. In our last issue of *Working Notes*, Sean Redmond Director of Pace, outlined some ideas about this. Certainly a job is one of the best deterrents against crime. But the delivery of real education and opportunity will demand an inter-agency approach with strong links to the local community such as that of the Area Based Partnerships. It will also require a planned release program for all offenders with supervision and support when they leave prison to help them to re-integrate into society in a way which gives them a real option to avoid crime.

This then is what we mean by the **education-restitution-opportunity provision** approach to crime which must parallel and intermesh with the **detection-conviction-imprisonment** approach if our criminal justice system is to be truly effective and if it is to be ethically defensible.

Tom Giblin, SJ

- (i) Department of Justice Discussion Paper, *Tackling Crime*, p. 35.
- (ii) *Ibid.*, p. 108.
- (iii) In the wake of the Bail Referendum, this overcrowding will probably be compounded by more and more remand prisoners being refused bail and detained in prison while awaiting trial. (*Ibid.*, p. 109) Simply building massive numbers of more prison spaces will be a very cost and humanly ineffective way of dealing with this crisis. Indeed it will absorb key resources that should be directed to implementing a fully operational system of sanctions which are alternatives to prison.
- (iv) *Tackling Crime*, p. 107-8, and Chapter 14.
- (v) The heroin of painkiller centred drug culture can be distinguished from the ecstasy centred drug culture which is more socially spread as it is based around a stimulant which enhances peak experiences. Of course many drug users take a menu of drugs but for most, one drug is the core drug in their addiction whether that addiction be physical or psychological.
- (vi) Department of Justice, June 1997, especially pages 61-2, 103-4, 114-5.
- (vii) See *Working Notes*, April 1997, Issue 28.
- (viii) Information on analysis of Zero Tolerance supplied by Paul Cavadino of NACRO.
- (ix) Institute of Public Administration, 1996, p.13-25.
- (x) See *Working Notes*, September 1996, Issue 26. The methadone maintenance program as it is presently administered really amounts to a form of covert 'legalisation' of a heroin type substitute. It may serve to reduce burglaries and larcenies but it fails to address the core problems of addicts.
- (xi) *Tackling Crime*, p. 40.
- (xii) *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- (xiii) For a description of the Grendon approach and the empirical evidence on its effectiveness see the paper by Tim Newell, Governor, HM Prisons, Grendon & Springhill, "Prisons as a Therapeutic Community", in the Irish Penal Reform Trust, *Is Penal Reform Possible?*, Conference Booklet, February 20th, 1997.
- (xiv) Lifestart has programs in Connemara, Ballyfermot, Lifford, Sligo, Wexford, Newtowncunningham, Derry, Enniskillen, Tullamore, Cork, Belfast, Coleraine, Strabane and Barcelona.

Diagram One




Diagram Two

